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Comment





Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) have
shown that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equili-
bria extend to economies with moral hazard and exclusive contracts.
Recently, in this Journal, Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) have argued
that Walrasian equilibria may (robustly) fail to exist when the class of
moral hazard economies in Prescott and Townsend’s work is generalized
to allow for aggregate, in addition to idiosyncratic, uncertainty, if pref-
erences are nonseparable in consumption and effort. In this comment,
we show that such a claim is incorrect and that the existence and effi-
ciency properties of Walrasian equilibria remain valid in the setup con-
sidered by Bennardo and Chiappori.
We briefly describe the moral hazard economy considered by Ben-
nardo and Chiappori (2003). There is a continuum of ex ante identical
individuals with measure one and a single consumption good. Individ-
uals are affected by both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic endowment
shock. Specifically, there are two aggregate states, , and twosp 1, 2
idiosyncratic states, , b. The individual’s endowment is higherjjp a ys
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wish to thank the editor, Robert Shimer, and two anonymous referees for very helpful
comments. Financial support from the Ministry for University and Research (project
2005135328_002) and the School for Advanced Studies in Venice to Gottardi and Fun-
dacio´n Ramo´n Areces and Spanish Direccio´n General de Ciencia y Tecnologı´a (projects
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in aggregate state than in for each realization of the idio-sp 1 sp 2
syncratic state j: . Similarly, is higher in idiosyncratic statej j jy 1 y y1 2 s
, no matter what the aggregate state s is: . Idiosyncratica bjp a y 1 ys s
shocks are independently and identically distributed across individuals
and are independent of the aggregate shock. The probability of each
aggregate state s is exogenous and is denoted by l and for1 l sp
and 2, respectively. On the other hand, the probability of idiosyncratic1
state j depends on an effort e supplied by the individual prior to the
realization of uncertainty (both aggregate and idiosyncratic). Effort can
be high or low; the set of effort levels is . Higher effort raisesE{ {e , e }l h
the probability of the high-endowment idiosyncratic state. Let the prob-
ability of state be when effort is high andjp a P(e )p P P(e )p p !h l
when effort is low. While the realization of uncertainty is publiclyP
observable, an individual’s effort is not.
Individuals have von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences described
by the (state-independent) Bernoulli utility function .u :  # E r 
For each e, is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,u(7, e)
and strictly concave with . Effort is costly, solim u(c, e)/cp  u(c,cr0
for all .e ) 1 u(c, e ) c  l h 
To establish our result, we first need to briefly lay out the structure
of markets.
Commodities.—The commodities traded are insurance contracts. An in-
surance contract specifies an effort level and a bundle of state-contingent
net trades. This specification is allowed to be random. As in Prescott
and Townsend (1984), the set of possible consumption levels in any
state is assumed to be a finite set with n elements, and maximalCO 
element . When aggregate state s is realized, the set of pos-jc¯ k max ys,j s
sible net trades (contingent on the two idiosyncratic states) is then
. An insurance contract is described as a pair2 a bZ p C  {(y , y )} xps s s
, where is a probability measure on the finite set , given(x , x ) x Z # E1 2 s s
by the vector satisfying
22n{P(z , z , e)}  s a b (z ,z ,e)Z #E a b s
P(z , z , e)p 1 for each sp 1, 2. (1) s a b
(z ,z ,e)Z #Ea b s
The terms are probability weights on triples of netP(z , z , e) (z , z , e)s a b a b
trades in the two idiosyncratic states and effort in aggregate state s. The
commodities traded by consumers are then elements x of , and
24n
denotes the commodity space.1
24nL{ 
The interpretation of x is as follows. First, a lottery prescribes an effort
1 An equivalent (though slightly more involved) analysis can be carried out when C is
an infinite set (e.g., ), and the measure space is then endowed withCp  M(Z # E) s
the weak-star topology (see, e.g., Jerez 2005). Our results extend to that case as well as
to the case in which there is an arbitrary number of consumption goods and states (see
also Rustichini and Siconolfi 2003).
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level e for the individual. This lottery is given by the marginal of withxs
respect to e. Remember that effort is chosen prior to the realization of
s, so this marginal must be independent of s, as stated in the following
condition:
x { P (z , z , e)p P (z , z , e). (2) e 1 a b 2 a b
(z ,z )Z (z ,z )Za b 1 a b 2
Thus effort e is prescribed with probability . Conditional on e, a secondxe
lottery specifies the individual’s net trades in the two idiosyncratic states
, for every aggregate state s. This lottery is described by the prob-(z , z )a b
ability distribution over , conditional on e, implied by . Since(z , z ) xa b s
effort is private information, the effort specification has to be under-
stood as a prescription, which to be effective must satisfy appropriate
incentive constraints (see below).
Conditional on the realization of aggregate state s, the expected utility
of an individual who exerts effort e and realizes net trades is(z , z )a b
a bv (z , z , e){ P(e)u(y  z , e) [1 P(e)]u(y  z , e).s a b s a s b
The expected utility from a contract x is then
l(v 7 x ) (1 l)(v 7 x )p l v (z , z , e)P (z , z , e)1 1 2 2 1 a b 1 a b
(z ,z ,e)Z #Ea b 1
 (1 l) v (z , z , e)P (z , z , e). 2 a b 2 a b
(z ,z ,e)Z #Ea b 2
The incentive compatibility constraints require that, whenever x pre-
scribes effort e, individuals prefer e rather than deviating to . It is′e
immediate to verify that the incentive compatibility constraints can be
equivalently written as follows:
l v (z , z , e)P (z , z , e) (1 l) v (z , z , e)P (z , z , e) ≥ 1 a b 1 a b 2 a b 2 a b
(z ,z )Z (z ,z )Za b 1 a b 2
′ ′l v (z , z , e )P (z , z , e) (1 l) v (z , z , e )P (z , z , e) 1 a b 1 a b 2 a b 2 a b
(z ,z )Z (z ,z )Za b 1 a b 2
(3)
for all e, .′e  E
Admissible trades.—Since trades are assumed to be observable, any re-
striction on trades can be imposed. Following Prescott and Townsend
(1984), the set of contracts available for trade to any individual (withX¯
some abuse of language, her consumption set) is the set of incentive-
compatible contracts, that is, the set of vectors satis-xp (x , x )  L1 2 
fying (1), (2), and (3).
Feasible allocations.—We will look at symmetric allocations in which all
individuals trade the same contract x. By the law of large numbers, when
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all individuals exert effort e, a fraction of them will end up inP(e)
idiosyncratic state a; hence the total (per capita) use of resources in
state s when the individuals’ net trade is is(z , z )a b
r (z , z , e){ P(e)z  [1 P(e)]z .s a b a b
A contract x satisfies the economy’s resource constraints if the total net
use of resources of such a contract is nonpositive in both aggregate
states:
r 7 x p r (z , z , e)P(z , z , e) ≤ 0, sp 1, 2. (4)s s s a b s a b
(z ,z ,e)Z #Ea b s
Incentive efficient allocations.—A (symmetric) allocation x is incentive
efficient if it maximizes the individual expected utility in the set of feasible
allocations:
max l(v 7 x ) (1 l)(v 7 x )1 1 2 2
¯xX
subject to r 7 x ≤ 0, sp 1, 2. (5)s s
Problem (5) is a standard (finite-dimensional) linear program, with a
nonempty feasible set.2 Hence, an optimal solution exists. Note that the
feasible set is convex (i.e., if contracts x and satisfy the incentive′x
compatibility and resource constraints, so does any convex combination
of these contracts).
Prices.—Prices are linear on the individuals’ consumption set, that is,
are linear in the probabilities. A price system is an element pp (p ,1
, where . The cost of a commodity
22np )  L p p {p(z , z , e)}  2 s s a b (z ,z ,e)a b
bundle is thenx  L
p 7 xp p 7 x  p 7 x p p(z , z , e)P(z , z , e). (6) 1 1 2 2 s a b s a b
sp1,2 (z ,z ,e)Z #Ea b s
Firm intermediaries.—Following Prescott and Townsend (1984), as
well as Bennardo and Chiappori (2003), we introduce firms with tech-
nology:
Yp {np (n , n )  L : r 7 n ≤ 0, sp 1, 2}. (7)1 2 s s
Firms can offer any set of contracts as long as the total net payments
required by the contracts offered are self-financing. The law of large
numbers allows us to write the self-financing constraint in expected
terms in each aggregate state. Since Y displays constant returns to scale,
profits are zero in equilibrium and there is no loss of generality in
assuming that there is a single firm.
2 For example, the allocation in which individuals exert with probability one andel
consume the expected value of their endowment in each aggregate state s is feasible.
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Definition. A competitive equilibrium is a triple (x*, n*; p*) 
such that (i) maximizes over the set3L x* l(v 7 x ) (1 l)(v 7 x )1 1 2 2
, (ii) n* maximizes over the set Y, and (iii)¯{x X : p* 7 x ≤ 0} p* 7 n
markets clear, or .x*p n*
Condition i requires to yield the highest utility to individuals amongx*
all admissible and budget-feasible contracts, and condition ii says that
n* is the profit-maximizing choice of the firm. Finally, condition iii says
that aggregate demand for contracts by individuals equals supply by
firms.
We now show that a competitive equilibrium always exists (in contrast
to proposition 5 of Bennardo and Chiappori [2003]).
Theorem 1. A competitive equilibrium exists. In particular, any
(symmetric) incentive-efficient allocation can be supported as a com-
petitive equilibrium.
Proof. It is immediate to verify (see also lemma 3 in Bennardo and
Chiappori [2003]) that, because Y displays constant returns to scale,
equilibrium prices are such that, for each , 2,sp 1
p(z , z , e)p b r (z , z , e), (8)s a b s s a b
for some ; that is, in each state s the price of net tradesb ≥ 0 (z , z )s a b
with effort e must be either actuarially fair (proportional to the expected
use of resources) or zero.
The rest of the proof relies on a constructive argument: for any so-
lution of the planner’s problem (5), we find prices satisfying (8) thatEx
support as a competitive equilibrium.Ex
We first prove that at the resource constraint must bind at least inEx
one state s. Suppose that both constraints were slack. Let be a deter-lx
ministic contract specifying low effort and maximal consumption withc¯
probability one (regardless of the realization of s and j). Contract islx
incentive compatible ( ) and strictly preferred to by the indi-l E¯x X x
vidual. Hence, so is any convex combination of and :E l ax x x p (1
with . For a sufficiently small, also satisfies theE l aa)x  ax a  (0, 1] x
resource constraints (4), so cannot be a solution to (5).3Ex
Consider then the case in which at the resource constraint doesEx
not bind in one state, say . This is the case analyzed in propositionsp 1
3 In general, any convex combination of a feasible contract x and is strictly preferredlx
to x, so there is local nonsatiation within the set of feasible allocations. The reason is that
deterministic contract , which gives maximal utility in the consumption set , is notl ¯x X
feasible (i.e., ).jc¯ k max ys,j s
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5 of Bennardo and Chiappori (2003).4 We claim that, when andb p 01
, the prices in (8) support as a competitive equilibrium. Sup-Eb p 1 x2
porting prices must reflect the shadow cost of resources in states 1 and
2. This cost is given by the shadow price of the resource constraint in
each state multiplied by the expected use of resources in that state.
Because the resource constraint in is slack at , its shadow priceEsp 1 x
is zero. On the other hand, the constraint binds in , so its shadowsp 2
price is positive and can be normalized to one. In sum, prices are zero in
and actuarially fair in , and so the price of a contract is the expectedsp 1 sp 2
use of resources in .sp 2
When consumers face the prices in (8) with and , theirb p 0 b p 11 2
problem becomes
max l(v 7 x ) (1 l)(v 7 x )1 1 2 2
¯xX
subject to p* 7 xp r 7 x ≤ 0. (9)2 2
It is then immediate to see that is a solution to this problem. SinceEx
the resource constraint in does not bind in the planner’s problemsp 1
(5), is a local maximum of (9). Furthermore, the fact that the ob-Ex
jective function is linear and the feasible set is convex in (9) implies
that is also a global maximum by the local-global theorem (IntriligatorEx
1971, 75).
When the firm faces the prices in (8) with and , profitsb p 0 b p 11 2
are . So (7) implies for all . Clearly,p* 7 np r 7 n p* 7 n ≤ 0 n  Y2 2
, because satisfies the resource constraints (4). Moreover, sinceE Ex  Y x
at (4) binds in , . Thus is a profit-E E E Ex sp 2 p* 7 x p r 7 x p 0 n*p x2 2
maximizing choice for the firm, and at this choice markets clear (con-
dition iii of the definition of a competitive equilibrium holds). This
proves our claim.
The argument is similar when both resource constraints bind at .Ex
Set b1 and b2 in (8) equal to the shadow prices and (both of which
E Eb b1 2
are now positive) of the resource constraints (4) at the solution ofEx
(5). Again, solves the consumer’s problem (9) for this price system:Ex
since , , and satisfy the first-order conditions of (5), solves theE E E Ex b b x1 2
first-order conditions of (9) for the price system specified above when
the shadow price of the budget constraint equals one (the Lagrangean
4 Bennardo and Chiappori derive sufficient conditions for to have this propertyEx
(proposition 4) and show that there is an open set of economies that satisfy them. In-
tuitively, if consumption and leisure are complements and the marginal utility of con-
sumption decreases fast enough with effort, there is a limit to the level of consumption
such that agents are still willing to provide high effort. Hence, when the aggregate en-
dowment in is high enough, part of the aggregate endowment will not be consumedsp 1
in that state.
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functions of [5] and [9] have the same form). The rest of the argument
is identical. QED
Remark 1. In equilibrium, aggregate consumption is lower than
the aggregate endowment in the high-endowment state (i.e., theresp 1
are resources not utilized in that state). However, there is no incentive-
compatible and budget-feasible contract that provides the consumer a
higher utility than by allowing her to consume additional resourcesEx
when is realized. This claim is in contrast with the one in thesp 1
proof of lemma 4 in Bennardo and Chiappori (2003). The authors argue
that, if the price associated with consumption in state 1 were zero re-
gardless of the effort level, the consumer could do better by buying a
different contract , where specifies low effort and a very high level′ ′x x 1
of consumption with probability one, whatever the idiosyncratic state.
Since is clearly not feasible, Bennardo and Chiappori concluded that′x
could not be zero at an equilibrium; the nonexistence resultp (z , z , e)1 a b
in proposition 5 then relies on such a claim. But this misses an important
point: namely, that effort is chosen before the realization of the aggre-
gate state; thus if specifies low effort with probability one, so must′x 1
(eq. [2]). While a contract specifying low effort with probability one′x 2
can provide a very high level of consumption if the high-endowment
state is realized, consumption in the low-endowment statesp 1 sp
may have to be rather low. The consumer in fact needs to pay a positive2
price for the consumption goods received in state 2, and the price can
be quite high—and the value of the endowment quite low—in sp 2
when the consumer exerts low effort.
Formally, if (as claimed by Bennardo and Chiappori) is feasible for′x
the consumer, it must induce agents to exert low effort (incentive com-
patibility has to hold) and the budget constraint must be satisfied:
′ ′ ′ ′p* 7 x p p* 7 x  p* 7 x p r 7 x ≤ 0.1 1 2 2 2 2
Also, if is strictly preferred to by the consumer, so is any convex′ Ex x
combination of and : with . For anyE ′ a E ′x x x p (1 a)x  ax a  (0, 1]
a, and satisfies the resource constraint in . Since at thea E¯x X sp 2 x
resource constraint in is slack, if a is sufficiently small, the samesp 1
is true at . But this contradicts the fact that is a solution to (5).a Ex x
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